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Favaloro v. Favaloro:1 Classification of Rights Associated
With Counter-letters as Real or Personal
I.

INTRODUCTION

John T. Favaloro (John T.) purchased certain immovable property
in Metairie, Louisiana, with the assistance of his cousin, John L. Favaloro (John L.) and an investor, Vincent F. Frazone. John T. recorded
title to the property in his own name as full owner, however, John L.
and Frazone furnished two-thirds of the purchase price. John T. issued
a counter-letter 2 to John L. recognizing him as two-thirds owner of the
property. John L. in turn issued a counter-letter to Frazone recognizing
his one-third ownership. John L. never recorded the counter-letter reciting his ownership interest.
On December 31, 1978, fourteen years after the issuance of the
original counter-letter, John L. returned the counter-letter to John T.'s
wife, Frieda. John L.'s wife, Gloria, witnessed John L.'s return of the
counter-letter to Frieda. John L. agreed to surrender his one-third interest
in the property for a promise that he would receive the income from
the property for the remainder of his life.
Following John L.'s death, Gloria C. Favaloro (John L.'s wife),
filed suit seeking to be recognized as one-third owner of the Metairic
property. 3 Gloria claimed that the surrender of the counter-letter by her
husband was not a valid transfer of immovable property because the
4
agreement was not reduced to writing.
The fourth circuit granted summary judgment for the defendant
(John T.) stating that "a person who receives a counter-letter purporting
to convey an interest in immovable property receives only a personal
right which may be asserted against the transferor, not an actual ownership right in the property." ' The court held that "[wihen a counter-

Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW Ravisw.

1. 561 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 1125 (1990).
2. The word has a Latin origin in which "letter" was what we call an "act." To
"give letters" meant "giving a written recognizance." The "counter-letter" is therefore
the writing which contradicts another act.
3. While the original counter-letter recognized John L. as two-thirds owner of the

Metairie property, Mrs. Favaloro's suit sought only a one-third interest. No claim was
made concerning the ownership of the other one-third interest transferred to Frazone
through the second counter-letter issued by John L. Therefore, discussion will be limited
to the one-third interest claimed in the suit.
4. La. Civ. Code art. 1839.
5. Favalaro. 561 So. 2d at 786.
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letter evidencing a promise of ownership is delivered to the original
transferor in return for valid consideration, the transferee surrenders his
right to interest in the property. No written document evidencing the
surrender of the right is necessary." 6
The classification of the counter-letter as representing only personal
rights was fatal to Mrs. Favaloro's claim. Mrs. Favaloro based the cause
of action on the premise that the counter-letter issued to John L.
represented an ownership interest and thus a real right in the property
that could be transferred only by an authentic act or act under private
signature in accordance with Louisiana Civil Code article 1839. The
court's classification of the right as personal allowed for an oral transfer
of rights because the counter-letter represented only a promise of future
ownership and not an actual ownership interest. This view rendered
Article 1839 inapplicable. The implications of a personal right classification go beyond the writing requirement of Article 1839. If the court
is correct, the holder of a counter-letter will be unable to enforce his
rights in immovable property by instituting a petitory action since such
real actions are limited to the holders of real rights.
The fourth circuit cited no authority for its determination that
counter-letters create merely personal rights between the immediate parties. This is particularly significant in light of Peterson v. Moresi,7 a
1939 Louisiana Supreme Court decision, which reached a contrary result.
It is the purpose of this note to examine the rights associated with
counter-letters in the transfer of immovable property and to determine
whether these rights are more appropriately classified as personal or
real.
First, this note will discuss the uses of counter-letters in simulated
transactions. Second, it will list the general characteristics of personal
and real rights. Third, it will compare the rights associated with counterletters to the characteristic of real rights. This note ends with a discussion
of the effects of classifying rights associated with a counter-letter as
real.

II. COUNTER-LETTERS: USES IN SIMULATED TRANSACTIONS
Counter-letteis are often used in connection with simulated contracts.

A contract is simulated when, by mutual agreement, it does not express
the true intention of the parties.' The simulation generally has two
aspects: an apparent act which appears to be valid on its face, but is
in reality fictitious, and a serious expression of will which remains secret. 9

6. Id.
7. 191 La. 932, 186 So. 737 (1939).
8.

La. Civ. Code art. 2025.

9. Lemann, Some Aspects of Simulation in France and Louisiana, 29 Tul. L. Rev.
22 (1954).

NOTES

1991]

When this secret intention is reduced to writing, it is called a counterletter. 10 Therefore, the counter-letter reflects the written expression of
the parties' will. Counter-letters are most prevalent in simulations involving the transfer of immovable property. The admissibility of parol
evidence to attack an apparent sale of immovable property by authentic
act or act under private signature is limited." The supposed transferor
may prove that the apparent sale of the property was in fact fictitious
only by means of a counter-letter or by admissions of the opposing
party in pleadings or interrogatories. "
Three basic types of simulations exist in which counter-letters are
used to affect the transfer of immovable property. First, the transferor
and transferee may agree to an absolute simulation." Typically in this
situation the parties will perfect an apparently valid act of sale; however,
the transferee does not pay the price and the transferor will usually
remain in possession of the property. A written counter-letter establishes
that the transferor never had the intention to alienate the property and
that the transferee is not the true owner. 4 The counter-letter will destroy
any claims of ownership by the transferee based on the authentic act.'"
The second type of simulation is the disguised transfer or relative
simulation. 6 In this situation, there is an intention to transfer the
property; however, the nature of the transfer differs from what is stated

in the authentic act. An example is where an authentic act may appear
to be a valid sale, but the transferee does not pay the price and the
transferor intends to make a donation." The counter-letter will reflect
the intention of the parties that the property was actually transferred
by donation rather than by sale.
10. La. Civ. Code art. 2025.
i. La. Civ. Code art. 1848 states:
Testimonial or other evidence may not be admitted to negate or vary the contents
of an authentic act or an act under private signature. Nevertheless, in the interest
of justice, that evidence may be admitted to prove such circumstances as a vice
of consent, or a simulation, or to prove that the written act was modified by
a subsequent and valid oral agreement.
The article does allow parol evidence to be admitted to prove a simulation. However,
use of such evidence is limited to claims by third parties in some instances. See La. Civ.
Code art. 1848 comment (c). Parol evidence is not admissible between the immediate
parties of an absolute simulation. The apparent transferor may not succeed in attacking
an absolute simulation in the absence of a counter-letter. See La. Civ. Code art. 2026
comment (b).
12. Rush v. Landers, 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95 (1902); Comment, The Action in
Declaration of a Simulation, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 457 (1943).
13. La. Civ. Code art. 2026.
14. 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on Civil Law No. 1188, at 677 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.

trans.
15.
16.
17.

1959).
Duncan v. Duncan, 26 La. Ann. 532 (1874).

La. Civ. Code art. 2027.
Lemann. supra note 9. at 23.
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Finally, a simulation may be accomplished by the employment of
third persons. 8 A person may wish to purchase property while keeping
his identity as transferee unknown to third persons. He will employ a
prete-nom' 9 who will lend his name to the transaction as purchaser;
however, the price is furnished by the principal. The prete-nom will
issue a counter-letter which recites that he is not the true owner of the
property. This type of simulation is not specifically recognized in the
civil code but has been recognized in Louisiana jurisprudence.2 0
The counter-letter issued in Favaloro is most appropriately categorized as a simulation by employment of third parties. John T. purchased
the property in his own name from a willing transferor clearly intending
to transfer title to the Metairie property. John L., however, furnished
one-third of the purchase price in the transfer. John T. issued a counterletter which stated that John L. was one-third owner. It appears that
John T. purchased one-third of the property on behalf of John L.
III.

PERSONAL AND REAL RIGHTS: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

A personal right is the legal power that a person (obligee) has to
demand from another person (obligor) to perform an obligation which
may consist of giving, doing, or not doing a thing.2 The Louisiana
Civil Code does not expressly define personal rights but definitions of
personal rights have developed through the jurisprudence. 22 In Reagan
v. Murphy,2 the supreme court stated in dictum that "[a] personal right
...defines man's relationship to man and refers merely to an obligation
one owes to another which may be declared only against the obligor." 24
This definition limits the rights of the obligee to specific performance
of the obligation or a compensatory judgment.
To determine whether or not particular rights are personal, one must
examine three factors. First, personal rights involve relations between
persons-the obligee who has the right to demand performance, and
the obligor who is required to give, do, or not do a thing. Second,

18. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 14, at 678.
19. 3 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law No. 2266-72, at 301 (11 ed. La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1959). Prete-nom is a species of the contract of mandate. The mandatary will
usually make his agency relationship with the principal known to the third parties with
which he deals. The purpose of the prete-nom is to lend his name to the principal and
to conceal the fact that he acts on behalf of the principal from third parties.
20. Peterson v. Moresi, 191 La. 932, 186 So. 737 (1939).
21. A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 134, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed.
1980).
22. Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958); Hardwood Oil and
Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So. 2d 764 (1960).

23.

235 La. 529, 105 So. 2d 210 (1958).

24.

Id. at 542, 105 So. 2d at 214.

1991]

NOTES

personal rights are only effective between the parties and cannot be
asserted against third persons. Finally, personal rights can only be enforced by obtaining a personal judgment against one or more of the
parties to the obligation. Personal rights are not susceptible to possession;
therefore, they do not include the right to follow a thing into the hands
of a third party. "5
Real rights appear to be synonymous with rights in things. 26 French
doctrine describes real rights as expressing the immediate and direct
relation between a thing and a person. The legal relation which stems
from a real right is between the person claiming the right and all other
persons who must respect the claim of exclusive and preferential use of
the thing.27 Louisiana jurisprudence describes real rights as "synonymous
with proprietary interest, both of which refer to a species of ownership.
Ownership defines the relationship of man to things and may, therefore,
be declared against the world."" This definition is somewhat narrow
in that it restricts real rights to an interest as owner and does not
include dismemberments of ownership such as personal and predial
servitudes, usufruct, and habitation which are classified as real rights
in the Civil Code. 29
Although the Civil Code does not expressly define real rights, they
are correlative to real obligations.3 0 The basic characteristics of real
obligations and thus real rights are two-fold. 3' First, a real obligation
is transferred automatically with the movable or immovable property.
Since the right passes with the property, the holder of a real right has
the power to claim the thing even after it has been transferred to a
third party. Second, enforcement of the real right does not impose
personal liability upon the possessor of the thing. The third party may
relieve himself of all liability by abandoning the thing to the holder of

25. A. Yiannopoulos, Property § 144, in 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed.
1980).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 476.
27. 2 Aubry and Rau, Property § 172 at 62, in Civil Law Translations (7th ed.
1961).
28. Reagan v. Murphy, 235 La. at 541, 105 So. 2d at 214 (1958).
29. La. Civ. Code arts. 476, 535, 630.
30. La. Civ. Code art. 1763 defines a real obligation as "a duty correlative and
incidental to a real right."
31. Article 1764 provides:
A real obligation is transferred to the universal or particular successor who

acquires the movable or immovable thing to which the obligation is attached,
without a special provision to that effect. But a particular successor is not

personally bound, unless he assumes the personal obligations of his transferor
with respect to the thing, and he may liberate himself of the real obligation
by abandoning the thing.
La. Civ. Code art. 1764.
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the real right. This allows the person asserting a real right to exercise
32
this right without obtaining a personal judgment against any party.
Common examples of real rights are ownership and dismemberments of
ownership such as personal and predial servitudes, usufruct, and habitation. The rights associated with real mortgages, pledges, and privileges
on immovables also meet the characteristics of real rights.
IV.

COUNTER-LETTERS: CHARACTERISTICS OF REAL RIGHTs

The classification of a counter-letter as representing a real or personal
right turns on the question of whether the counter-letter represents an
ownership interest. If the counter-letter is an act translative of ownership,
then the holder of the counter-letter asserts a real right of ownership.
The fourth circuit, in Favaloro, considered the signed counter-letter a
promise to sell 3 or executory contract between John T. and John L.
rather than a transfer of ownership. Using language such as "the recipient of a counter-letter receives only the right to sue the transferor
for ownership and an accounting, ' 3 4 as well as, "a counter-letter evidencing a promise of ownership,"" to describe the rights associated
with the counter-letter, the court implied that a counter-letter is a promise
to transfer ownership at a future date.
A promise to sell must be in writing when it relates to immovable
property. It is not effective as a transfer of property but instead gives
the recipient of the promise the right to demand specific performance
for ownership of the immovable.3 6 Promises to sell appear to be personal
rights because they can only be enforced by obtaining a personal judgment against the obligor. This view corresponds with the holding in
Peck v. Bemiss.3 7 In Peck, Sims, acting as agent for Overton, the owner
of immovable property, executed a written promise to sell the property
to Peck. This promise to sell was recorded in the public records. The
property was later sold by Overton to Mrs. Bemiss. Peck filed a petitory
action against Mrs. Bemiss claiming ownership of the property. The
supreme court held that the promise to sell did not convey an ownership

32. Nonpersonal judgments include Petitory Actions, provided for in La. Code Civ.
P. art. 3651, Declaratory Judgments, provided for in La. Code Civ. P. art. 1871, and
Partitions, provided for in La. Code Civ. P. art. 4606-4607, because they can be attained
without subjecting another party to personal liability.
33. La. Civ. Code art. 2462 provides: "A promise to sell, when there exists a reciprocal
consent of both parties as to the thing, the price and terms, and which, if it relates to
immovables, is in writing, so far amounts to a sale, as to give either party the right to
enforce specific performance of same."
34. Favaloro v. Favaloro, 561 So. 2d 783, 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
35. Id.
36. La. Civ. Code art. 2462.
37. 10 La. Ann. 160 (1855).
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interest in the property to Peck. Therefore, Peck had no right to file
a petitory action against Mrs. Bemiss.
Whether a promise to sell immovable property creates real or personal rights is unclear. The supreme court in Kinberger v. Drouet 8 stated
that "[a] promise of sale, duly accepted and recorded, confers a real
right on the purchaser . . . . 9 The confusion stems from the fact that
a promise to sell, once recorded, can have effects on third persons. 4
For example, in Peck v. Bemiss,41 had Peck first sued Overton for
specific performance based on the contract to sell, he could have then
joined Mrs. Bemiss by filing a petitory action seeking ownership of the
property. Peck could have perfected his ownership interest in the property
as of the time of recordation of the promise to sell and recovered the
property from the hands of a third party. In this situation Peck could
assert a real right of ownership against a third party. However, between
the immediate parties of a promise to sell there is only a personal right
to obtain specific performance for the transfer of ownership.
Under a fact pattern similar to Favaloro, the supreme court in
Peterson v. Moresi" addressed the issue of whether a counter-letter
represents a contract to sell or an actual ownership interest in property.
In Peterson, A.P. Moresi purchased seven acres of land from William
McFarlain. On the same day, Moresi signed an instrument which he
called a "Recognition of Interest. '43 The instrument recognized the
undivided ownership of the plaintiffs in the seven acres and stated that
"said named persons have paid their pro rata share and portion of said
purchase price, and when so requested I will execute an act of transfer
conveying to them or their assigns their respective interest in said premises."" Plaintiffs later filed suit against A.P. Moresi's widow to be
decreed the owners of the undivided interests in the land as set forth
in the counter-letter. Mrs. Moresi claimed that the counter-letter represented only an executory contract because it contemplated the future
execution of an act or transfer between A.P. Moresi and the persons
named in the counter-letter. The court determined that the expression
in the counter-letter "did not mean that an act of transfer by A.P.

38. 149 La. 986, 90 So. 367 (1922).
39. Id. at 999, 90 So. at 372.
40. La. R.S. 9:2721 (1991). "No sale, contract, counter-letter, lien, mortgage, judgment, surface lease, oil, gas or mineral lease or other instrument of writing relating to
or affecting immovable property shall be binding on or affect third persons or third
parties unless and until filed for registry in the office of the parish recorder of the parish
where the land or immovable is situated . .

.

41. 10 La. Ann. 160 (1855).
42. 191 La. 932, 186 So. 737 (1939).
43. The court stated: "The instrument is more of the character of a counter-letter
than of any other instrument that has been suggested." Id. at 940, 186 So. at 739.
44. Id. at 935-936, 186 So. at 738.
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Moresi to the co-owners named in the instrument would be essential to
joint ownership which was acknowledged in the instrument. A.P. Moresi
acknowledged in the instrument, not only that each of the other parties
named in the instrument owned the interest stated, but also that he
himself owned only the remaining 4/21 interest in the seven acres of
land."14 Mrs. Moresi also claimed that the enforcement of the counterletter was barred by prescription of ten years on personal actions. 6 This
defense was based on the fact that the plaintiffs sought specific performance of A.P. Moresi's offer to execute an instrument of transfer
and was, therefore, a personal obligation. The court held that "the suit
being founded upon a written acknowledgement by the defendant that
the property was bought by him as the agent for the plaintiff, and was
paid for by the plaintiff and actually belongs to him-is not a personal
action, but a real action, and is not barred by the prescription of ten
years under article 3544 of the Civil Code.""' The plaintiffs were not
limited to a personal judgment of specific performance but were issued
a declaratory judgment acknowledging their ownership interest.
The supreme court, in Peterson, recognized the plaintiffs' real right
of ownership in the seven acres based on the counter-letter. Since the
counter-letter represented an ownership interest and not a promise to
sell, the plaintiffs were declared owners of an undivided interest without
obtaining a personal judgment against the record owners. Applying this
holding to Favaloro, it appears that Gloria Favaloro had more than a
promise of ownership based on the counter-letter which recognized John
L.'s one-third interest in the Metairie property. She had a real right of
ownership which could be asserted without the need of obtaining a
personal judgment for specific performance against John T.
The assertion that counter-letters may reflect a right of ownership
in immovable property is strengthened by the fact that counter-letters
possess the two major characteristics of real rights. The recipient of a
counter-letter may recover immovable property from third persons (once
the counter-letter has been recorded), and he may also exercise his right
to ownership without obtaining a personal judgment.
The fact that recorded counter-letters may affect third persons is
recognized in Louisiana legislation," as well as in the jurisprudence.' 9

45. Id. at 938-939, 186 So. at 739.
46. La. Civ. Code art. 3544 (1870). La. Civ. Code art. 3499 now provides: "Unless

otherwise provided by legislation, a personal action is subject to a liberative prescription
of ten years."
47. Peterson, 191 La. at 941-43, 186 So. at 740.
48. La. R.S. 9:2721 (1991). (For text of the statute see supra note 40.).
49. See Stevens v. Claiborne Co., 305 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Metairie
Bank and Trust Co. v. Wendryhoski, DeBlanc, and Associates, 338 So. 2d 978 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1976).
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In Stevens v. Claiborne Co.,1° Mrs. Stevens acquired record title of
immovable property through an act of sale in 1964. The recorded deed
recited that the property was purchased with Mrs. Stevens' separate
funds. In 1967, Mr. and Mrs. Stevens recorded a counter-letter which
stated that the 1964 purchase was actually made with community funds.
Subsequent to the recordation of the counter-letter, Mrs. Stevens, acting
individually, granted a mortgage on the property to the Claiborne Company. Claiborne later attempted to foreclose on the mortgage and Mr.
Stevens intervened asserting the community's freedom from the mortgage.
The fourth circuit stated that "[w]hile counter-letters cannot affect persons who became creditors or purchasers prior to the recordation of
the counter-letters ... the recorded counter-letter is valid against one
who takes from the prior record owner a mortgage subsequent to the
recordation of the counter-letter . ..
I."I'Based on the recorded counterletter, the community was recognized as owner of the property and the
mortgage that the wife attempted to grant on the community property
was declared invalid. If we apply the facts of Stevens to current Civil
Code article 2347, the same result would be reached had Mrs. Stevens
attempted to alienate the property subsequent to the recordation of the
counter-letter. Once ownership is vested in the community by virtue of
a recorded counter-letter, any attempt to transfer the property to a third
party would be declared null, without the concurrence of both spouses."
The ability of the holder of a counter-letter to exercise his rights
without obtaining a personal judgment is evident in the holder's right
54
to institute a real action such as a. petitory action." 3 In Ducros v. Couret,
Sidney J. Ducros (Sidney) took title to certain immovable property in
Jefferson Parish. On the same day he executed a counter-letter to his
brother, Robert L. Ducros (Robert). The counter-letter declared that
title was placed in the name of Sidney at the request of, and for the
convenience of Robert, who was the real purchaser, and the purchase
price was in reality paid by Robert. The counter-letter was recorded in
the parish records. Following Sidney's death, a three-sixteenths interest
in the property was vested in Mrs. Claire Ducros Couret by judgment
of possession. Robert made a demand upon Mrs. Couret to acknowledge
his ownership by quitclaim deed. When his demand was rejected, Robert
filed suit. The court stated that "[tihe petition seeks to have Robert L.

50. 305 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
51. Id. at 571.
52. La. Civ. Code art. 2347.
53. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3651. "The petitory action is one brought by a person
who claims the ownership, but who is not in possession, of immovable property or of
a real right therein, against another who is in possession or who claims the ownership
thereof adversely, to obtain judgment recognizing the plaintiff's ownership."
54. 82 So. 2d 782 (La. App. OrI. 1955).
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Ducros recognized as the owner of property alleged to be in possession
of the defendant. It has all the elements of a petitory action, and in
the trial court it was apparently regarded as such by both plaintiff and
defendant."" The court held that Mrs. Couret had no claim or title to
the undivided three-sixteenths interest based on the counter-letter reflecting Robert's ownership of the property.
In Ducros, the counter-letter was recognized as an act translative
of ownership sufficient to maintain a petitory action against the record
owner, Mrs. Couret. The only real distinction between the counter-letter
in Ducros, and the counter-letter described in Favaloro, is the fact that
Robert Ducros recorded his counter-letter in the parish records. Recordation, however, does not change the nature of the right from personal
to real. If the counter-letter is translative of ownership, failure to record
has no effect on the immediate parties to the transaction. It is only
when dealing with third parties that recordation becomes essential to
the exercise of real rights involving immovable property. The public
records doctrine requires that an act translative of ownership must be
recorded before it can affect third persons. 6 The doctrine is basically
a policy decision to promote the stability of title to immovable property
in Louisiana. The purchaser of immovable property acquires a real right
of ownership; however, the exercise of this real right is limited by the
laws of recordation. Therefore, when immediate parties are involved as
in Favaloro, failure to record the counter-letter has no effect on the
exercise of real rights.
Another example of the ability of the holder of a counter-letter to
exercise his rights without obtaining a personal judgment is found in
Charles Tolmas, Inc. v. Bressler."' This case involved a suit for partition
of immovable property." Max Bressler purchased sixteen lots in the city
of New Orleans. Record title was placed in his name as owner. On the
same day Bressler issued a counter-letter to Charles Tolmas, Inc. recognizing its one-half ownership in the property. The corporation recorded
the instrument. Unwilling to remain any longer as an owner in indivision,
Charles Tolmas, Inc. petitioned the court for a partition of the property
in kind or by licitation. The court, recognizing the corporation's undivided ownership interest by virtue of the recorded counter-letter, ordered a partition of the property by licitation.
The common thread which bonds these cases is the fact that counterletters reflect an ownership interest in immovable property. As such, a

55. Id. at 783.
56. See La. Civ. Code arts. 517, 1839; La. R.S. 9:2721, 2754, 2756 (1991). See also
McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
57. 230 La. 1087, 90 So. 2d 55 (1956).
58. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4606 (partition in kind); La. Code Civ. P. art. 4607
(partition by licitation).
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recorded counter-letter is effective against third persons who acquire the
property subsequent to recordation. Also, the recipient of a counterletter may exercise his rights of ownership by asserting nonpersonal
actions such as a petitory action or partition. The real rights associated
with counter-letters are the rights of ownership. In the next section we
will look at this real right classification as it affects the Favalorodecision.
V.

EFFECTS OF

A REAL RIGHT CLAIFICATION ON FAVALORO

Mrs. Favaloro based her claim on the fact that the counter-letter
issued to her husband, John L., represented a one-third ownership
interest in the Metairie property. As such, the surrender of the counterletter was ineffective as a transfer of immovable property. This ownership
interest could only be validly transferred by a written agreement between
the parties. 59 If, as we have seen, the counter-letter does represent a
real right of ownership, Mrs. Favaloro's claim is not wholly without
merit. Article 1839 declares that "[a] transfer of immovable property
must be made by authentic act or by act under private signature.' ' 6 It
appears that in order to conform with this writing requirement John
L. should have first recorded his counter-letter in the parish records
and then executed an act of sale of the one-third interest to John T.
There is, however, another factor which must be considered when
examining the ownership rights associated with counter-letters. The basic
purpose of a counter-letter is to contradict an authentic act. It proves
that the authentic act is fictitious and true ownership is in reality vested
in the party holding the counter-letter. The parol evidence rule6' limits
the use of oral evidence to negate or vary the contents of an authentic
act. Parol evidence is not admissible between the immediate parties to
prove an absolute simulation. In this situation, the authentic act is
presumed to be valid and may be attacked only by the introduction of
a written counter-letter or by admissions of the opposing party in pleadings or interrogatories. The holder of an unrecorded counter-letter, by
surrendering it to the record owner, effectively surrenders his right to
attack the validity of the authentic act. He is estopped from claiming
his ownership interest because he lacks written evidence that the apparently authentic act was in reality fictitious. The end result is the
holder's loss of ownership by surrendering the counter-letter to the record
owner. Mrs. Favaloro, however, is not barred from asserting her own-

59. Note that Mrs. Favaloro did not appear to claim that the transfer was invalid
under La. Civ. Code art. 2347 (alienation of community property; concurrence of the
other spouse). She appears to concede the fact that she consented to the surrender of
the counter-letter. Therefore, this issue will not be addressed.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 1839.
61. See supra note II.
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ership claim under the parol evidence rule. John T. admitted the existence
of the counter-letter, as well as, the oral transfer of John L.'s onethird interest in his answer. Based on this admission, Mrs. Favaloro
should be allowed to prove that the oral transfer of interest in the
immovable property was invalid.
Favaloro could have been resolved by the court without classifying
the rights associated with counter-letters as real or personal. Ironically,
Mrs. Favaloro's claim is defeated by the same Civil Code article which
she used to support her cause of action. The second sentence of Article
1839 states that "an oral transfer is valid between the parties when the
property has been actually delivered and the transferor recognizes the
transfer when interrogated on oath." 6 Mrs. Favaloro admits that an
oral transfer took place between her husband, John L., and the defendant
John T. The facts indicated that John L. actually received the income
from the property in consideration for the transfer of the one-third
interest. The court also stated that "[a]uthentic real estate titles which
are valid on their face, properly recorded, and accompanied by delivery
and continuous control as owner afford potent presumptions of ownership." 63 It appears that John T. was in possession of the property.
Applying Article 1839 to these facts, the oral transfer of John L.'s onethird interest is a valid alienation of his ownership interest.6 No writing
requirement is necessary, therefore, Mrs. Favaloro states no cause of
action.
V1.

CONCLUSION

The basic purpose of a counter-letter is to contradict an authentic
act in simulated transfers of immovable property. It proves that the
authentic act is fictitious and true ownership is in reality vested in the
party named in the counter-letter. In Favaloro, the counter-letter was
used to establish that John L. had in fact purchased a one-third interest
in the Metairie property.
The fourth circuit's holding that a counter-letter evidences only a
promise of ownership and thus a personal right, appears to be contrary
to Louisiana legislation and jurisprudence. The Louisiana Supreme Court
has recognized that a counter-letter reflects an ownership interest. As
such, the recipient of a counter-letter may exercise his real right of
ownership by asserting nonpersonal actions such as a petitory action or
a partition of immovable property. A recorded counter-letter is valid

62.

La. Civ. Code art. 1839.

63. Favaloro v. Favaloro, 561 So. 2d 783, 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Litvinoff, The Action in Declaration of Simulation in Louisiana Law, in Essays on the
Civil Law of Obligations, at 139 (1969)).
64.

See Lemoine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 34 So. 2d 392 (1948).
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against third persons who acquire the property subsequent to recordation.
However, failure to record the counter-letter does not change the nature
of this real right of ownership between the immediate parties to the
transaction.
The alienation of the rights conferred by a counter-letter should be
required to conform with the writing requirement of Article 1839. The
counter-letter represents an ownership interest and should be validly
transferred by authentic act or by act under private signature. An oral
agreement followed by manual delivery of the counter-letter is insufficient
to alienate ownership rights in immovable property. There are, however,
two exceptions which may apply. First, in situations where parol evidence
is not admissible to prove a simulation, delivery of the counter-letter
to the second owner will effectively bar subsequent claims of ownership
by the party surrendering the instrument. The second exception is the
situation faced by the court in Favaloro. The oral transfer and delivery
of the counter-letter is valid when the record owner is in actual possession
of the property and the transferor of the counter-letter recognizes the
manual delivery when interrogated under oath.
Randal J. Robert

